Introduction . A major point on the agenda of history of philosophy of science is to u nderstand how the European and the American version of logical empiricism were related. E uropean logical empiricism is said to be not "intellectually continuous" with its American
scientific philosophy, into the "neutral" philosophy of science known as the "received view".
In this paper I'll argue that "external factors" do not suffice to explain the above-mentioned transformation. There was indeed a "discontinuity" in the evolution of logical empiricism, but it took place already in Europe before the logical empiricists emigrated to the New world.
This European discontinuity affected the development of logical empiricism in America and paved the road to the "neutral" philosophy of science as which logical empiricism ended i n the seventies of the last century.
The first main thesis of this paper is that the European discontinuity was caused by an inherent tension between two opposing background factors that determined much of Germanspeaking European philosophy in the early decades of the 2 0 th century, namely the a ntagonism between Neokantian currents of "scientific" philosophy" and irrationalist Lebensphilosophie. Carnap put forward two different proposals to solve this tension:
(1) The first proposal was the Aufbau's "comprehensive scientific philosophy" (CSP). A ccording to it the constitution theory of the Aufbau was the core of scientific philosophy.
Science, philosophy, and progressive movements in education, politics and the arts were to collaborate to bring about a just and enligthened socialist society (cf. Aufbau,
Introduction, Manifesto).
Values were considered as philosophically respectable entities that any good constitution system had to comprise.
( 2 ) The second proposal was a more "restrictive scientific philosophy" (RSP) f i r s t outlined Philosophy and Logical Syntax (1935) . According to (RSP), philosophy was the syntactical theory of the language of science. Consequently, (RSP) had not p o l i t ical or societal commitments whatsoever. In Logical Foundations of the Unity of Science (Carnap 1938 ) (RSP) was even denied to be philosophy at all.
The shift from (CSP) to (RSP) began around 1930 and amounted to a radical reconception of logical empiricism. The politically engaged version of logical empiricism was theoretically given up by the replacement of (CSP) by (RSP). This change, I hasten to add, did not mean that Carnap's political and societal engagement vanished around 1930. It lived on at an emotional level, so to speak, but it was no longer backed by theoretical considerations. The theoretical realm of scientific philosophy and the practical realm of social and political commitment became strictly separated. This separation of the theoretical and the practical paved the road to the transformation of logical empiricism into the neutral philosophy of science that became known as the "received view".
The most visible symptom of the substitution of (CSP) by (RSP) was a strict anti-cognitivist stance of the latter. But anti-cognitivism was only the tip of the iceberg of a more profound difference between the two currents, as became evident when European logical empiricists and American pragmatists came into closer contact from the thirties onwards.
While the (RSP)-version of logical empiricism endorsed a Cartesian separation between the practical and the theoretical, American pragmatists were opposed to any kind of Cartesian dichotomies; in particular, they did not draw a neat line between facts and values.
The second main thesis of this paper contends that the difference between European logical empiricism and its American successor was prefigured by the difference between (CSP) and (RSP): (RSP) laid the theoretical foundations for what was to become "philosophy of science" in the American sense. The "transformation" that European logical empiricism underwent should therefore not solely be explained by external causes such as the forcible emigration or the cold war etc. Rather, there were internal reasons as well that explain why the logical empiricists undertook their journey to the "icy slopes of logic" (cf . Neurath 1929, 339) and lost contact with the lowlands of science and common sense.
As will be shown in the sequel, these internal reasons are particularly important to understand why the sustained efforts of the American pragmatists failed to forge a synthesis between the two currents. Manifesto, was not feasible. According to the new program of (RSP) philosophy was to be pursued as the theory of the syntax of scientific language (cf. Carnap ,1935 . In this frame there was no room for value statements, psychological, sociological, or historical considerations about science.
The shift from (CSP) to (RSP) did not mean that the members of the Vienna circle suddenly lost interest in "value-laden" topics such as bringing about a just socialist society, o r assessing the on-going developments in politics or art. Quite the contrary, in the early thirties Carnap's political commitment in the Vienna Circle, the Ernst Mach Society, and similar institutions reached its peak. But his commitment was based on his Lebensgefühl and not related to scientific philosophy in the sense of (RSP The choice of basic values was a matter of "character" (cf. Carnap 1929, and Carnap 1 9 6 3 , 1009) . This meant, for instance, that there was no moral difference between a "consequent capitalism" founded on the value of individual enrichment and "socialism" based on the value of solidarity. The choice of basic values dropped out of the rational discourse. There were no reasons for a choosing one basic value or another. It was a matter of taste or "character".
This entailed that value statements were cognitively meaningless. Values were relegated to irrational Leben. They became impulses and instincts that might be studied by psychology, biology or other sciences, but that no longer belonged to the sphere of reasons. The resulting picture of the world was most clearly presented in his semi-popular lectures Philosophy and Logical Syntax (1935) . Distinguishing between the two basic functions of language, namely, expression and representation, he proposed the following scheme (Ibidem, 32): It never occurred to Carnap that science might involve theoretical and practical knowledge.
Consequently, his system did not provide a place for practical knowledge. This scheme of the relations between philosophy, science, and arts remained essentially intact when Carnap had immigrated to America. Of course, the conception of philosophy of science as syntax of scientific language was replaced by one that took into account also semantical and "pragmatic" aspects of scientific language. But semantics remained as theoretical as syntax, and, as
Morris rightly remarked, Carnap's "pragmatics of scientific language" was a far cry from pragmatism and remained rather underdeveloped.
Summarizing one may say that already in Europe Carnap had covered a long way towards the "icy slopes of logic" (Manifesto, 339), which recently were claimed to be characteristic f o r "logical empiricism in the age of Cold War" (cf. Reisch 2005) . From the mid-thirties onwards Carnap's logical empiricism was no longer engaged theoretically in practical issues of society and politics. 1 This fact was masked by his ongoing political commitment. This, however, did not take place in the theoretical framework of (RSP) but was motivated by his
Lebensgefühl marked by the cultural and political context of "Red Vienna". "The hard-and-fast line which is supposed by some to exist between "emotive" and "scientific" language is a reflex of the gap that exists between the intellectual and the emotional in human relations and activities. … The practical problem that has to be faced is the establishment of cultural conditions that will support the kinds of behavior in which emotion and ideas, desires and appraisals, are integrated (Dewey 1970 (Dewey (1944 .
It is hard to say whether Dewey knew much about the role Leben and Lebensphilosophie had Independently of the constitution theory Morris saw still another possibility for a rapprochement between Carnap's logical empiricism and pragmatism in which value judgments would be important, namely, the realm of rules and proposals that had become central to Carnap's philosophy. This option referred to (CSP) and (RSP) alike. As Morris pointed out, Carnap often went beyond a mere logical analysis and reconstruction of scientific knowledge, making proposals of how science, society and life might be organized:
"In the Logische Aufbau Carnap writes that life has many dimensions other than science, and the restriction of the term "knowledge" to science is helpful to the friendly relation between the various spheres of life, for the admission of complete heterogeneity would lessen the strife between them (pp. 257/8) This may or may not be the case, but the statement is certainly more than a logical analysis of science. I t contains a recommendation or proposal, made in terms of a theory of the relation of science to other human activities." (Morris 1963, 97) Indeed, making "proposals" or "recommendations" was to become one of the most important characteristics of Carnap's mature style of philosophizing. Already in the first paper he published in America, On the Character of Philosophic Problems ) he was at pains to bar possible misunderstandings concerning the (RSP) conception of philosophy of science as logic or syntax of science, pointing out that a philosophical theorem, formulated as a proposition of syntax, could be read in two different ways, namely, as an assertion, o r , most often more appropriate, as a proposal (cf. . In the following decades he emphasised the proposal character of philosophy again and again (cf. Testability and Meaning (1936/37) and Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology (1950) ). From a pragmatist point of view "making proposals" is a value-laden activity. Proposals are made for realizing certain goals that are assessed to be valuable (cf. Lewis 1971) . In (Carnap 1950 ) these pragmatic questions were characterized as "external questions" and contrasted with "internal questions" that could be decided by empirical and/or logical methods. Carnap denied that external questions were a legitimate topic of rational deliberations. Rather, he believed in a kind of Darwinian conceptual evolution 2 in which only the fittest would survive:
"The acceptance or rejection of linguistic forms … will finally be decided by t h e i r efficiency as instruments, the ratio of the results achieved to the amount and complexity of the efforts required. … Let us grant to those who work in any special field of investigation the freedom to use any form of expression …; the work in this field will sooner or later lead to the elimination of those forms which have no useful function." Carnap (1950, 221) Evidently, this process of elimination is determined by a complex net of preferences, evaluations and practical assessments. Nevertheless, according to (RSP) this fact was of no concern to philosophy. Rather, the only task of philosophy, as a theoretical activity, was to propose frameworks that were to be used, and eventually be approved or rejected by t h e i r "The basic error in the fact-value dualism lies in the supposition that sooner o r later every value judgment must come to rest upon an absolute end, one which i s valued unconditionally, without ifs, ands, or buts. Factual considerations relate only to such conditions, and when these have been let go, we are left afloat in a sea of subjectivity. That absolute values are groundless does indeed imply that rationality precludes them; but the conclusion that they underlie all value judgments, which therefore cannot be objective, only begs the question." (Kaplan 1964, p. 394) Kaplan's position directly contradicted Carnap's Cartesian dualism according to which i n every value judgment one could neatly distinguish between means and ends such that eventually a purely optative component could be singled out that had no cognitive meaning whatsoever. As Carnap put it: "In contrast to Kaplan's conception, I assert [that] there are pure optatives. Cognitivism may be defined as the denial of this thesis." (Carnap 1 9 6 3 , 1001). According to him, a typical pure optative was a sentence like "Let us take road a rather than b." Such a sentence, Carnap insisted, had no cognitive meaning since no factual sentence was logically implied by it. Hence, according to the logical empiricist meaning criteria as laid down, for instance, in Overcoming thirty years earlier, a pure optative was cognitively meaningless. It should be noted that Carnap's argumentation was based on a very strict meaning criterion: only classical deductive logic was could bestow cognitive meaning to a proposition p, the meaning of p defined as the totality of propositions that can be deduced from it. Inductive logic or any other kind of logic dealing with only plausible and less than perfect arguments cannot convey cognitive meaning to a proposition. This not only flew into the face of any pragmatist account, but also was hardly plausible in the light of Carnap's tolerance principle. have meant "to blur the difference between "attitude and theory" which was "of decisive importance" for his philosophy in general, as he had already pointed out in Overcoming ( p .
9 ) .
Thus, for Carnap emotivism was not a surface phenomenon. Rather, it was a symptom of a deeply entrenched Cartesian predicament caused by the tension between Leben and Geist typical for much of Central European philosophy of the early 20th century. It served as the signpost for the conviction that philosophy and science were essentially theoretical endeavors that should be kept separated from the unfathomable feelings and practices of life.
This view was imcompatible with pragmatism. Such a verdict squarely contradicts
Richardson's recent diagnosis, who proposed to discuss the issues of cognitivism and emotivism as a merely rhetorical difference between the logical empiricist and the pragmatist program. More precisely, according to him the rhetoric of logical empiricism was demarcationist: "the point was to demarcate the proper role of science and to find the scientifically acceptable replacement for a core of scientific philosophy" … [. On the other hand, Dewey's characteristic rhetoric is said to be "imperialist": the point is to bring scientific rigor into all areas of philosophical concern..." (Richardson 2002, S45) .
In this paper I have argued that the dispute about the cognitive status of value judgments should be taken as a symptom of a more profound epistemological difference, namely, the d i fference between a Cartesian approach of (RSP) that strictly separated the theoretical and the practical, and an anti-Cartesian (pragmatist) approach that denied that such a separation made sense. External causes aggravated this dualism but they only brought to the fore what had been laid down theoretically already around1930 when the Neokantian (CSP) version of logical empiricism was replaced by the (RSP) version. Thus, although there can be no doubt that external factors contributed to the evolution of the American brand of logical empiricism, this development was also marked by internal factors of European provenance that should not be neglected if one wants to get the picture right.
